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Improving energy efficiency is viewed as a major means to curb greenhouse
gas emissions and, more generally, to limit the negative externalities generated
by energy production, distribution, and use. This has led many countries to
include ambitious energy efficiency objectives in their climate plans. As an il-
lustration, the European Union set a binding target mandating a 20% reduction
in energy use by 2020 relative to a business-as-usual scenario and current policy
discussions focus on a 30% target for 2030.
Taxing energy taxation the primary policy strategy to reduce energy use, but
it is usually combined with sector-specific policies. This is particularly true for
buildings, which are responsible for a sizable share of total energy use (e.g. 40%
in the EU). Many countries grant tax credits and subsidies to energy retrofits
of existing buildings. Building codes include energy performance provisions for
new buildings.
Another popular policy approach consists in providing potential buyers or
tenants with information on the energy performance. In the European Union,
so-called Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) give information on a prop-
erty’s typical energy use and energy cost, an energy efficiency rating from A
(most efficient) to G (least efficient), practical advice on improving such per-
formance. Their publication is compulsory in all advertisements for the sale
or rental of buildings since 2007. In other countries, energy labeling is usually
voluntary (e.g. Energy Star, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design).
The rationale for EPCs, and energy labeling more generally, is that buy-
ers/tenants do not observe a dwelling’s or an office’s energy performance before
moving in. In economic parlance, energy performance is an experience-good at-
tribute. That is, a product characteristic which is difficult to observe in advance,
but that will be revealed after the transaction. When considering a given prop-
erty, a potential buyer or a tenant thus depends on the information provided by
the seller/landlord who have clear incentives to manipulate this information by
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overstating the performance.
By limiting these informational asymmetries, EPCs are primarily expected
to improve the matching between properties with heterogeneous energy perfor-
mance and households on the real estate market. In particular, households with
high energy needs – and thus a high willingness to pay for energy performance
– will be able to choose energy-efficient properties, while households with lower
needs will opt for cheaper, but lesser efficient properties. EPCs also raise the
incentives to invest in energy efficiency as the price of energy-efficient properties
is higher than that of inefficient ones. These two mechanisms are expected to
reduce energy use and to improve social welfare.
We develop a dynamic model which examines the impact of EPCs on the
level energy use, investments, and social welfare and find results that partly
contradict these arguments. The model describes how the building stock of a
city evolves over time. It includes two main ingredients: First, homeowners1
can make investments to upgrade their dwelling’s energy performance. Second,
a fraction of dwellings is sold on a competitive real estate market in each period.
We use this framework to identify the equilibrium investment paths with and
without energy certification, and the resulting impact on energy consumption.
We confirm that, in the absence of other market imperfections, the introduc-
tion of EPCs improves social welfare in any case. However, the impact on the
level of energy use and on the volume of energy efficiency investments is ambigu-
ous. This has a very important policy implication. In a second-best world where
energy externalities are under-priced and/or where consumers have behavioral
biases that hinder investments (myopia), EPCs can damage social welfare. This
calls for using EPCs in contexts where other imperfections are addressed by
adequate instruments.
Literature on Building Energy Certification We contribute to the eco-
nomic literature on energy labeling of buildings with the first theoretical study
1Although we cast the model in terms of residential homes, it equally applies to office
buildings.
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dealing with its impact on energy use, retrofit investments and social welfare.
Almost all existing studies are empirical and concentrates on the impact on
housing prices and rents (e.g., Brounen and Kok, 2011, Kok and Quigley, 2008,
Fuerst and McAllister, 2011, Fuerst et al., 2015, Hyland et al., 2013, Jensen
et al., 2016, Kok and Jennen, 2012). They commonly find a positive impact
although some studies are not able to identify whether this signals the effects of
energy performance per se or the sole effect of labeling. The policy implications
of these results are however limited. The ultimate objectives of energy labeling
is reducing energy use and improving social welfare. In theory, this can occur
through two mechanisms: a better matching between heterogeneous households
and dwellings and higher investment incentives. The existence of a price pre-
mium is a necessary condition for this to occur, but is not sufficient to test for
these goal achievements.
An exception is a paper by Comerford et al. [2016] who examine the impact
on energy performance. Relying on UK data, they identify a threshold effect.
After the introduction of the EPC, more homes have an energy rating just above
the D grade and less homes have a rating just below (the color-coded letter grade
of the EPC overlaid a pre-existing 0-100 point scale. It illustrates a situation
already identified by Dranove and Jin [2010]: sellers might want to game the
system when information is disclosed. Here, sellers seem to invest in a strategic
way to reach the letter D. This leads to potential inefficiency issues: some sellers
might over-invest to reach the letter D, some sellers might under-invest because
their letter is already D or above.2.
Note that we only refer here to schemes which publicly disclose energy per-
formance on real estate markets. There have been many studies on private
signals providing home occupiers with informational feedbacks on their home
energy consumption (for instance, see Jessoe and Rapson [2012]). The under-
lying mechanisms are totally different since this information does not reduce
informational asymmetries on real estate markets, but is expected to mitigate
2In this respect, Sallee and Slemrod [2012] develops an interesting evaluation of the size of





We develop a dynamic model in discrete time, which describes the evolution of
the building stock of a city. The stock include dwellings with energy performance
θ. Each dwelling can either be energy-efficient (θ = 1) or inefficient (θ =
0). The dwellings are owned and occupied by a continuum of households with
heterogeneous energy needs.3 More specifically, each household consumes a
quantity of energy θ × e per period where e is distributed over [0,+∞) with




edF (e) < +∞.
Let qt denote the share of efficient dwellings. We assume that all dwellings
are inefficient at the beginning of the game: q0 = 0. Any household can then
invest in any period to upgrade its property if θ = 0. The cost is I and θ = 1
after investment, which is irreversible and which has an infinite lifetime (after
investment, the energy performance is 1 over the entire time horizon). The
share of efficient dwellings at time t is qt.
In each period, m households exogenously move out and sell their dwelling
to the same number of households living outside the city who move in. Incoming
and outgoing households are drawn from the same distribution. The exogene-
ity of moving decisions captures the fact that most people decide to move in
or out for professional or family reasons that are not related to home energy
performance. The real estate market is competitive.
When there is certification, energy performance is perfectly observable be-
fore the sale. Without certification, we assume that incoming households only
observe it after moving in. The timing of events within each period t is as
follows:
3We extend the analysis to the rental case in section XX.
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1. m households move out and m households move in.
2. Outgoing households sell their dwellings to incoming households.
3. Incoming households observe the energy performance of their home.
4. Each household living in an inefficient dwelling (θ = 0) decides whether
to invest I or not.
5. Payoffs are realized.
Last, we assume that all households form perfect expectations about future
housing prices in all scenarios.
2.2 Social optimum
We can now identify the investment path and the allocation of households in the
dwellings that implement the first best outcome. Under our assumptions, this
optimum minimizes the discounted sum of investment and energy expenditures
over the entire time horizon:







Pt(θ = 0|e)(1 + α)edF (e) + (qt+1 − qt)I
)
Consider first the socially optimal matching rule in period t contingent on a
given building stock with a share of energy efficient dwellings qt. In this context,
perfect marching requires the allocation of households with the highest energy
needs in the energy-efficient dwellings. Formally, let g∗t denote this socially op-
timal allocation function e 7→ θ which maps each household type to a dwelling’s
level of energy performance in period t. Perfect matching means that:
g∗t (e
∗
t ) = 1{e≥e∗t } (1)
where e∗t is the limit type which binds the city capacity constraint: 1−F (e∗t ) =
qt.
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Turning next to the investment path, recall that the distribution of house-
holds’ types e does not vary over time: incoming households are drawn from the
same distribution as that of the initial population. As a result, an investment
in a given dwelling should either be made in the first period or never, which in
turn leads to a time-invariant threshold e∗t . Ignoring the time index, the value
of e∗ is then obtained by considering that the investment decision in period 1
should be made as if the same household was staying forever. In this context,
energy retrofit is socially optimal if the household e is such that the investment









where δ denotes the household discount factor. This completes the characteri-
zation of the social optimum.
Lemma 1 (Social optimum). In the first best optimum, investments are only
made in period t = 1 and the share of efficient dwellings is q∗ = 1 − F (e∗)
with e∗ = I(1− δ) for any t > 0. The energy-efficient dwellings should then be
occupied by households with types higher than e∗: g∗t (e
∗
t ) = 1{e≥e∗}).
3 Decentralized Equilibrium with an EPC
In this section, we examine the equilibrium investment path under perfect infor-
mation on energy performance. From now on, let ut(e, θ) denote the expected
lifetime surplus of a household of type e living in a dwelling with performance θ
at the beginning of period t. In the case where the dwelling is efficient (θ = 1),
this surplus is given by the recurrence relation:
ut(e, 1) = δ[mp
1
t+1 + (1−m)ut+1(e, 1)]
That is, the energy expenditure is zero in period t while the household moves
out in the next period with probability m, thereby selling the dwelling at price
9
p1t+1, or stays with probability 1−m and derives surplus ut+1(e, 1).
When θ = 0, the surplus depends on whether the homeowner invests or not.
Denoting uIt (e) and u
∅
t (e) the expected utility is:
ut(e, 0) = max{uIt (e), u∅t (e)} (3)
with:
uIt (e) = −I + δmp1t+1 + δ(1−m)ut+1(e, 1)
u∅t (e) = −e+ δmp0t+1 + δ(1−m)× ut+1(e, 0)
We now examine how incoming households are allocated in the different
dwellings by the real estate market. To start with, perfect information implies a
separating equilibrium with a price premium for the energy efficient dwellings:
p0t < p
1




t , and the allocation




gt(e)dF (e) = qt.
• Incentive compatibility: gt(e) = argmax
θ
ut(e, θ)− pθt .
From the incentive compatibility condition easily follows that the market
perfectly matches the households with the dwellings. That is, there is a thresh-
old type such that all households with lower types purchase inefficient dwellings
whereas the highest types choose efficient ones. Hence gt = g
∗
t .
Lemma 2 (Perfect matching). Under perfect certification, all incoming house-
holds with types such that e ≥ ẽt where ẽt is defined by F (ẽt) = 1− qt purchases
energy-efficient dwellings.
Proof. By contradiction, assume there exists e1 < e2 such that gt(e1) = 1 and
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gt(e2) = 0. From the incentive compatibility, this would imply that
ut(e1, 1)− p1t ≥ ut(e1, 0)− p0t
ut(e2, 1)− p1t < ut(e2, 0)− p0t
This is not possible because the function ut(e, 1)−p1t −ut(e, 0)+p0t is increasing
with e. To see this, note first that p1t and p
0
t do not vary with e because the
market is competitive. This also holds true for ut(e, 1) which only depends
on the price trajectory as shown by Eq.(??). Last, from Eq.(3) follows that
ut(e, 0) is decreasing with e as u
∅
t (e) is decreasing. The market clearing condition
directly gives the value of the threshold ẽ.
A direct implication is that the relative prices in equilibrium are those mak-
ing the limit type ẽ indifferent between both dwelling types:
Corollary 1. In the market equilibrium, we have p1t − p0t = ut(ẽ, 1)− ut(ẽ, 0).
In order to predict the investment decisions in this market environment, we
now compare uIt with u
∅
t . It is intuitive that investors are the households with
the highest energy needs.
Lemma 3. In period t, a household of type e living in an inefficient dwelling
invests if e ≥ ĕ where ĕ is the unique solution of u∅t (e, 0) = uIt (e, 0).
Proof. uIt does not vary with e while u
∅
t is strictly decreasing with e. When
e → ∞, we have u∅t → −∞, implying that uIt > u∅t . Last, we show that
uIt (0)−u∅t (0) < 0 when e = 0 by contradiction. Assume that uIt (0) > u∅t (0) ≥ 0.
This implies that have uIt (0) = ut(0, 0) = −I + ut(0, 1), and thus ut(0, 1) −
ut(0, 0) = I. We know that ut(e, 1)−ut(e, 0) is increasing with e, meaning that
ut(0, 1)−ut(0, 0) < ut(ẽ, 1)−ut(ẽ, 0). Corollary 1 then implies that I < p1t −p0t ,
which is absurd.
Establishing that perfect certification implements the first best is then straight-
forward as we just need to show that ẽ = ĕ = e∗.
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Proposition 1. Perfect certification implements the first best optimum.
Proof. uIt (ĕ) = u
∅
t (ĕ) implies that −I + ĕ + δm(p1t+1 − p0t+1) + [ut+1(ĕ, 1) −
ut+1(ĕ, 0)] = 0. From Corollary 1 and ẽ = ĕ follows that this equation is
equivalent to −I + ĕ + δ(ut+1(ĕ, 1) − ut+1(ĕ, 0)) = 0. Plugging ut+1(ĕ, 1) =
uIt+1 + I yields that ĕ = I(1− δ) = e∗.
The intuition underlying this result is as follows. Lemma 2 implies that
investing households anticipate that, if they move out in a next period, their
home will be purchased by the highest types. As incoming types are drawn from
the same distribution, they invest as if they were going to stay forever in the
dwelling, trading off the investment cost and the total discounted energy cost
e/(1− δ).
4 Equilibrium without EPC
The main difference with the certification case is that we now have a pooling
equilibrium on the real estate market with p0t = p
1
t . This greatly simplifies the
analysis as the real estate market gives zero value to energy retrofit (p0t = p
1
t )
and incoming households are randomly assigned to the dwellings.
When making an investment decision, the households just need to compare
the investment cost with the savings in their own energy consumption in the








This condition shows a partial internalization of the investment benefit by
the investor. As the household may move out and sell its dwelling with per-
period probability m, investing households discount the future at rate δ(1−m),
that is the conventional discount rate times the probability of staying in the
next period. Hence, we have:
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Lemma 4. In any period, a household of type e living in an inefficient dwelling
invests if e ≥ ê where ê = I(1− δ(1−m)).
Although individual investment incentives are lower than the first best in
a given period, they persist over time in contrast with the first best where all
investments are made in the first period. The reason is that the randomized
market allocation implies that high types inevitably move in inefficient dwellings
in each period. Once installed, they cannot but invest to consume less energy.
To be more precise, the process unfolds as follows:
• At t = 0, all households occupy inefficient dwellings.
• In period 1, the types higher than ê upgrades their home. As a result, the
share of inefficient dwellings is F (ê) at the end of the period.
• At the beginning of period 2, m households randomly move out. A share
mF (ê) of inefficient dwellings are thus (randomly) sold to incoming house-
holds. Households moving in these inefficient dwellings invest if their type
is higher than ê. The share of efficient dwellings thus increases up to
(1−m)(1− F (ê).
The process goes on so that we have
Lemma 5. In period t, the share of efficient dwellings is qt = 1 − F (ê)[1 −
m(1 − F (ê))]t−1. The overall level of energy investment flow is It = mI(1 −
F (ê))F (ê)[1 − m(1 − F (ê))]t−1 and the overall level of energy consumption is




Proposition 2. Households never stop investing so that the share of efficient
dwellings converges to 1 in the long run: qt → 1. The levels of per-period
investments and energy use converge to zero: Et → 0 and It → 0
This dynamics is represented in Figure 1 which compares the evolution over
time of qt with and without certification. Accounting for the dynamics of the
building stock thus yields the counter-intuitive results that the absence of en-
ergy certification leads to more energy efficiency investments and less energy
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consumption in the long run. This trajectory however damages social welfare
compared to energy certification which implements the first best optimum.
Figure 1: Example of energy-efficient dwellings stock qt trajectories
Until now, it has been assumed that EPCs are introduced at t = 0 (when
q0 = 0). From a policy perspective, it is more realistic to consider that certifi-
cation is introduced in period τ > 0. We now investigate this case, introducing
two additional assumptions. First, owners do not anticipate the introduction
of certification in previous periods. Before τ > 0, their investment behavior is
thus not influenced by future signals on the real estate market. Second, at the
beginning of period τ , the share qτ of energy-efficient buildings and the alloca-
tion correspond to those of the trajectory described in Lemma 5. Under these
assumptions, it is straightforward that:
Proposition 3. In the case where the EPC is introduced at the beginning of
period τ , all investments are immediately made. This leads to a (constant)
share of efficient dwellings such 1 > qτ+1 > q
∗. After τ , per-period energy
consumption Et decreases towards a value E
∞
τ which verifies E
∗ > E∞τ > 0.
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The proof and the intuition is straightforward. In period τ , there remains
a share qτ of inefficient dwellings, which can be lower or higher than the first
best. Suddenly, a price gap between efficient and inefficient dwellings appears
on the real estate market. The households occupying inefficient dwellings whom
types lies in between ê and e∗ thus decide to invest. At the end of the period,
there however remains one inefficiency: there remain low types who live in
efficient dwellings. This imperfect matching will progressively vanishes in the
next periods when the low types will move out and sell their property to high
types. Note that this result decisively hinges upon the assumption that moving
decisions are exogenous. That is, we rule out cases where low types living in
efficient dwellings would all move in inefficient dwellings in the city, thereby
increasing their surplus by selling at a high price to high types.
5 EPC in a second best world
We have just seen that introducing EPCs may lead to higher energy consumption
and lower cumulative investments. This implies that certification may reduce
welfare in a second-best world where energy externalities are not sufficiently
internalized or where households do not invest enough due to behavioral biases
or other imperfections (”myopia).
5.1 Under-priced energy externalities
Assume now that energy expenditure e generates an externality αe which is not
internalized with a tax or another policy instruments. Households thus use too












in the first best with a threshold e∗∗ = I(1− δ)/(1 + α) which is lower than e∗.










It is then clear that the difference with the EPC scenario is ambiguous. In
particular, it depends on the cumulative F . If most households lie in between
e∗ and ê (the population has intermediary energy needs), they will not invest in
the absence of EPCs), leading to a higher energy use4. This is just the opposite
if most of the households have high energy so that e > ê. Their propensity
to invest is identical in the first period, but a fraction of incoming households
continue to invest in the next periods without EPCs because they move in an
inefficient dwellings.
Depending on the size of the externality, this can lead to a higher social cost







Pt(θ = 0|e)(1 + α)edF (e) + (qt+1 − qt)I
)















1− δ(1−m(1− F (ê)))
(1− F (ê))− (1− F (e∗))
]
> 0
The sign of this (cumbersome) welfare difference is ambiguous. If α is very
small, the EPC scenario converges to the first best. If α is large, EPCs may
damage welfare if qt quickly converge towards 1. And we have seen that this
depends on the distribution F (among other factors). We collect these insights
in a new proposition.
Proposition 4. In the case where energy consumption generates an externality
of size α per unit, introducing EPCs may damage social welfare. This ultimately
depends on the sets of parameters m, δ, I, α and on the distribution of energy
needs F .
4Formally, F (ê) → 1, implying that the first multiplicative tends to be equal across sce-
narios (1/(1− δ)) while the integral tends to 0 in the EPC scenario.
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5.2 Owner myopia
The empirical literature on residential energy efficiency provide evidence that
energy users may under-estimate future private energy savings when making in-
vestment decisions (for a general discussion, see Gillingham and Palmer [2014]).
This leads to decisions that are not privately optimal and justifies the existence
of policies that promote investments (e.g., subsidies, tax credits).
In line with these arguments, assume now that the owners discount future
costs with a private discount factor µ which is higher than the social discount
rate δ. Again, one can expect that the absence of EPCs, which increases in-
vestments in the long run, may be more efficient. By analogy with the previous














1− δ(1−m(1− F (êµ)))
(1− F (êµ))− (1− F (e∗µ))
]
> 0
with e∗µ = I(1−µ) and êµ = I(1−µ(1−m)). This difference is again ambiguous
and we have a proposition which is similar to the previous one.
Proposition 5. In the case where owners discount too much the future, intro-
ducing EPCs may damage social welfare. This ultimately depends on the sets
of parameters m, δ, I, α and on the distribution of energy needs F .
6 Conclusions
We have developed a dynamic model featuring a building stock with endogenous
energy characteristics. The model includes three main ingredients. First, in the
absence of EPCs, potential buyers do not observe energy performance before
moving in their new home (experience good). Second, each homeowner can
invest in order to increase his/her dwelling’s energy performance. Third, an
exogenous fraction of dwellings is sold in each period.
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If asymmetric information on quality is the only market failure, we show
that EPCs implement the social optimum. Less intuitively, the impact on the
volume of investments and on the level of energy use is ambiguous. In the short
run, that is, holding fixed the energy characteristics of the building stock, EPCs
decrease energy use by improving the matching between buyers with hetero-
geneous energy needs and dwellings with heterogeneous energy performance.
In the long run, EPCs can however either decrease of increase investments in
energy efficiency, and thus energy use. Two countervailing factors drive this
outcome. On the one hand, EPCs create on the real estate market a wedge
between the price of efficient dwellings and inefficient dwellings. Homeowners
are thus more prone to retrofit their homes because they anticipate a possible
resale in the future. On the other hand, EPCs give potential buyers with two
instruments to reduce energy use: purchasing an inefficient dwelling and invest
or purchasing a dwelling which is already efficient. In contrast, investing is their
unique instrument if they do not observe energy performance. In the long run,
this increases investments as the random allocation of newcomers inevitably
leads to the installation of a fraction of households with high energy needs in
inefficient properties.
These results have important policy implications. In a second-best world
where energy externalities are under-priced – leading to a too high energy use –
and/or where consumers show behavioral biases that hinder investments (my-
opia), EPCs can thus damage social welfare. It is however extremely difficult to
identify the contexts in which this could occur, in particular, because household
heterogeneity – captured by the shape of the distribution of e in our setting
– strongly influences the equilibrium path. This thus calls for using EPCs in
contexts where other imperfections are properly addressed by other instruments.
While the empirical literature on EPCs and energy labeling is well developed
as mentioned in introduction, it yields nearly no useful inputs for our conclusions
as it does not deal with the impacts on energy use and investments.
These are preliminary results and we plan extending the paper in several
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directions. First, we want to generalize the results to the rental case. While
the above mechanisms would still operate, the investment incentives are clearly
lower without EPCs as the owner derives zero benefit from energy savings.
Second, we want to calibrate the theoretical model with realistic figures in order
to derive more clear-cut results on the impact of EPCs. Third, we also plan to
explore the impacts of voluntary labeling.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Extension: rental case with landlords and tenants
We now consider the case where households rent their dwellings.
7.1.1 Model
Compared to the previous sections, we now distinguish two categories of agents:
landlords and tenants (we still consider a continuum of agents in both cate-
gories). Landlords play an infinite-horizon game. At each period, they offer
their dwelling for rent. Landlords are profit-maximizers and can weatherize
their dwelling for a cost I. Tenants have a type e distributed according to the
cumulative distributive function F as in the previous sections. At each period, a
tenant has an exogenous probability m of moving out of the city and m incoming
tenants move in.
At each period occurs the following sequence:
1. m tenants inside the city exogeneously decide to move out. Landlords
who own empty energy-inefficient dwellings can choose to weatherize their
dwelling for a cost I.
2. m tenants outside the city decide to move in. Incoming tenants pick up
their new dwelling in a competitive equilibrium setting. Energy-efficient




3. Incoming tenants learn the energy performance of their new dwellings if
not previously known. Tenants who live in energy-inefficient dwellings can
weatherize their dwelling for a cost I.
21
4. Tenants of type e who live in an energy-efficient dwelling receive a payoff
e. Tenants who live in an energy-inefficient dwelling receive zero payoff.
Similar results for such a setting.
8 Appendix
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